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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between financial statement
informativeness (FSI) and intellectual capital disclosure (ICD).
Design/methodology/approach – While FSI was measured as the explanatory power of financial
information in explaining market value, ICD was collected through content analysis of annual reports.
A sample of 126 US companies, divided into two groups – high-tech and low-tech companies – were
used in this study. Empirical analysis was carried out using the Poisson regression method.
Findings – The results show a negative (substitutive) relationship between FSI and ICD, especially in
high-tech companies. This indicates that companies with low FSI disclosemore information about their
IC in annual reports.
Practical implications – This study confirms the role of voluntary ICD as a solution towards
mitigating the problem of the distortion of financial information due to the lack of accounting
recognition of IC as an asset in the financial statements.
Originality/value – This is the first empirical study to analyse the relationship between FSI and ICD.
Therefore, it serves as feedback to the regulators and standard-setters that recently published
recommendations on voluntarily disclosing IC.
Keywords Intellectual capital, Disclosure, Financial statement informativeness,
High-tech companies, USA
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Investments in intellectual capital (hereafter IC), such as for research and development
(R&D), human resources, employee training, customer relations, information systems
and other areas are seen today as being the main value creators for several companies
and economic sectors. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD, 2013), these IC investments continue to increase and have reached
a high level in today’s world. They have even exceeded dedicated physical and financial
capital expenditures in certain developed economies. This is especially the case in the
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USA where economic indicators have shown that IC investments have exceeded
physical and financial capital since 2002 (Corrado et al., 2005, 2010; OECD, 2006a, 2006b,
2013).
However, despite the increased growth in IC investments and their economic
importance for companies and the economy in general, their accounting recognition in
corporate financial statements is still not evident. In the specific case of the USA, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) accounting rules in effect put forth
several reasons that generally hinder the recognition of IC investments in financial
statements, including the difficulty related to their control and measurement and the
difficulty of evaluating future cash flows and the related high level of uncertainty.
Therefore, according to the conservatism principle, most IC investments are to be
immediately expensed when incurred, while the benefits resulting from these
investments will be recorded later (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Lev et al., 2005; Zéghal and
Maaloul, 2011). As a result, themain accounting principle of periodicallymatching costs
with revenues is seriously biased, affecting in turn the financial statement
informativeness. In this context, some researchers showed that the non-recognition of IC
in financial statements has led to the deterioration of the value-relevance of financial
information in explainingmarket value (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Brown et al., 1999; Core
et al., 2003; Dontoh et al., 2004).
This non-recognition of IC could also have other adverse socio-economic
consequences for companies, financial markets and society in general. Indeed, if a
company’s financial statements are established based on conservative estimates of
earnings and book value, inefficiencies (myopia) may arise in the resource allocation
process on the financial market (Lev et al., 2005; Zéghal and Maaloul, 2011). In this
respect, some empirical studies have shown that the non-recognition of IC aggravates
the information asymmetry between a company’s insiders and outsiders (Aboody and
Lev, 2000;Mohd, 2005), resulting inmisvaluation of the company and its future earnings
(Lev et al., 2005; Ali et al., 2012), making company shares relatively illiquid (Boone and
Raman, 2001) and increasing its cost of capital (Seow et al., 2006; Giovly and Shi, 2008).
To prevent this distortion of the resource allocation mechanism on the financial
market, several initiatives have been taken these past few years by accounting (FASB,
2001; IASB, 2010; etc.), financial (SEC, 2003; EFFAS, 2008) and economic (OECD, 2006a,
2006b, 2013; EC, 2011) standard-setters to improve the quality of information provided
to investors and other users. These initiatives resulted in the development of a certain
number of frameworks and guidelines with the goal of encouraging the voluntary
disclosure of IC information outside of financial statements to offset any shortcomings
in financial information regarding IC.
Although there are also a number of theoretical and descriptive studies that
encourage managers to voluntarily disclose IC information as a solution to compensate
for the loss of the relevance of financial information (Lev, 2003; Skinner, 2008; Zéghal
and Maaloul, 2011), there is no study that has attempted to validate this view
empirically. This is precisely the objective of our study, according to which we attempt
to empirically analyse the relationship betweenfinancial statement informativeness and
IC disclosure. Following the publication of these frameworks and guidelines for
disclosing IC, our study can be seen as a tool that can be used to assess their current
application by companies and to empirically validate the theoretical statements made
by researchers and standard-setters.
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The rest of this article will be organised as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the
accounting treatment of IC. Section 3 then defines the concepts of financial statement
informativeness and voluntary disclosure, while looking at themain results found in the
academic literature. The hypothesis development for our study is presented in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the methodological choices made in our study. The results obtained
and their analyses will be covered in Section 6. Lastly, the conclusion summarizes the
main results of this research.
2. Accounting treatment of IC
An IC investment appears in the corporate assets if it meets at the same time the
definition of an intangible asset and the accounting recognition criteria. However, the
accounting standards impose, for the accounting of IC, conditions that are so restrictive
that only few investments can appear in the company’s balance sheet (Zéghal and
Maaloul, 2011).
An intangible asset is defined by the FASB (ASC 350) as an “asset, other than a
financial asset, that lacks physical substance”. This definition must, nevertheless, be
interpreted jointly with the general definition of an “asset”. An asset is defined by the
FASB (SFAC 6, §25) as a “probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a
particular entity as a result of past transactions or events”.
Following this general definition of an asset, the notion of “control” is going to raise
an accounting problem with IC. According to the FASB (SFAC 6, §26), an enterprise
controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to obtain the future economic benefits
flowing from the underlying resource and also can restrict the access of others to those
benefits. In this context, in the case of IC, some questions arise such as the protection of
employees’ skills and knowledge. Lev (2001) underlines that companies do not own their
employees or the ideas which they have in their heads. He discusses the control problem
under the title of “Partial Excludability”. For example, when a company invests in
training its employees, other companieswill benefit from such investments if the trained
employees switch employers. As a result, these IC investments could not be capitalised
because of the lack of certainty relating to the contractual relation between the company
and its employees.
Upton (2001) also underlines that an enterprise may possess items that meet the
definition of assets, but will still not recognise those items in financial statements.
Indeed, an important recognition criterion required by accounting standards (FASB,
SFAC 5 §63), namely, “the reliability of measurement” of asset cost, raises another
accounting problem with IC. This criterion could be easily satisfied if the asset is
separately acquired (SAFS 142) because the acquisition price was generally determined
during the transaction and appears under monetary form or other monetary assets, and,
therefore, the cost can be reliablymeasured. It could be also easily satisfied in the case of
business combination (SFAS 141) when the asset cost is the asset’s fair value at the time
of business combination. The fair value can in fact be reliably measured if there is a
market price provided in reference to an active market. However, the reliability of
measurement criterion presents great difficulty in the case of internally generated assets
such as software, patents, trademarks, and the like, i.e. the results of R&D activity.
For example, according to FASB rules, R&D expenditures must be expensed when
incurred (SFAS 2), except for the development costs of computer software that can be
capitalised (SFAS 86). However, the capitalisation of these costs is conditional on the
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successful achievement of technological feasibility tests. In this sense, the costs incurred
to establish the technological feasibility of a product are considered R&D under SFAS 2
and expensed as incurred. Inversely, the costs incurred after establishing technological
feasibility and before the product is available for general release are capitalised.
According to the FASB’s conclusion in SFAS 2, many reasons can explain the decision
for immediate expensing of R&D costs. These reasons are related to uncertainty of
future benefits, inability to measure future benefits, lack of a causal relationship
between costs and benefits and lack of usefulness to investors.
3. Financial statement informativeness and IC disclosure
3.1 Financial statement informativeness
Byfinancial statement informativenesswemean the accuracy of the signal coming from
the company’s financial reporting system (such as earnings and book value of equity). A
piece of financial information is said to be “informative” if it is relevant or useful, and can
therefore make a difference in the decisions made by users of a company’s financial
statements (Tasker, 1998; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Lougee andMarquardt, 2004; Francis
et al., 2008; Hail, 2013).
According to the market efficiency theory, all relevant financial information should
be immediately and completely transposed into the company’s stock price. Along with
this, some authors, including Collins et al. (1997) and Aboody et al. (2002), defined the
relevance of financial information as the extent towhich financial reporting explains the
intrinsic value of the stock.
By using different companies’ valuation models, researchers have tried to look at
the link between financial information and market value over the past few decades.
In this area, Lev and Zarowin (1999) used a sample of US companies to show that the
usefulness of financial statements to investors has clearly diminished over the past
two decades from 1977 to 1996. They concluded that the inability to recognise the IC
information has led to diminished relevance of a company’s financial information.
Moreover, Brown et al. (1999) reported that, over a period from 1958 to 1996, the
relevance of earnings and book value of equity has declined in terms of explaining
stock prices of US companies. According to these authors, this decline is in fact due
to the substantial costs associated with IC investments. These costs were charged to
expenses instead of being capitalised, thus reducing earnings and the book value of
equity.
In a similar study, Dontoh et al. (2004) also found that explanatory power (R2) for
the regressions of stock price on earnings and book values of US companies had
dropped over the period from 1983 to 2000. Evidence has also shown that this
decline was more marked in highly IC-intensive companies. For their part, Liang
and Yao (2005) confirmed this trend by using a sample of Taiwanese companies in
the high-tech industry. Indeed, their results show that traditional financial
information does not provide any significant explanatory power in terms of the
company’s market value.
Using 20 years of US data, Fung et al. (2010) also documented a declining trend inR2s
of the association between stock prices and financial information. More recently, Hail
(2013) used a large international sample to examine whether financial statements have
lost their relevance over the past 30 years (from 1981 to 2008). He found that the loss in
relevance of financial statements continues in recent years, especially in common law
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countries with strong institutions, strong investor protection, strict disclosure
requirements and integrated markets.
3.2 IC disclosure
Given that current accounting standards do not allow the capitalisation of most IC
investments, several regulators and standard-setters have recommended that
companies voluntarily disclose information on IC beyond the financial statements (for
example, in annual reports). FASB (2001) describes voluntary disclosure as being
information primarily outside of financial statements and complementary notes that is
not explicitly required by accounting rules or standards. This type of disclosure
includes financial information and other types of non-financial information that
company managers consider relevant for the needs of different user groups (Beattie
et al., 2004; Bin Abdullah and Ku-Ismail, 2008). Non-financial information may contain
both qualitative and quantitative indicators (OECD, 2006a).
Still in the early stages of development, the studies on IC disclosure generally have
their theoretical foundations in economic theories such as agency theory and signalling
theory, as well as socio-political theories, such as the stakeholder theory and the
legitimacy theory (Guthrie et al., 2004; Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Alberti-Alhtaybat
et al., 2012). These studies can be broken down into three streams: studies on:
(1) the extent and type of information disclosed on IC;
(2) the underlying determinants for disclosing IC information; and
(3) the consequences of disclosing information on IC.
In the first stream, several longitudinal studies show that the companies increased their
level of IC disclosure over time (Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Vergauwen et al., 2007;
Wagiciengo andBelal, 2012; De Silva et al., 2014). Other studies have examined the types
of IC information disclosed by companies to investigate whether they are quantitative
(numerical) or rather qualitative (descriptive/narrative) in nature. In this context, the
majority of studies find that companies disclose more information about IC in a
qualitative (descriptive/narrative) form than in a quantitative (numerical) form (Beattie
et al., 2004; Striukova et al., 2008; SoonYau et al., 2009; Li et al., 2008; De Silva et al., 2014).
In the second stream, studies report many factors that could encourage or,
conversely, discourage IC disclosure. Here, a number of studies found that the level of IC
disclosure increases with the company’s size (Bozzolan et al., 2003; Oliveira et al., 2006;
Soon Yau et al., 2009; Kumar, 2013), its performance (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), its
growth level (Garcia-Meca et al., 2005) and its involvement in R&D activities (Zéghal
et al., 2007). Other studies also found additional factors that could positively affect the
level of IC disclosure. These include items such as the efficiency of the system of
corporate governance (Zéghal et al., 2007; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008);
operating in a high-tech sector (Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Sonnier, 2008; Kumar, 2013),
being listed on several national and foreign stock markets (Garcia-Meca et al., 2005) and
the auditing of accounts by the Big 4 (Oliveira et al., 2006). However, on the other hand,
the literature shows that certain factors can prevent companies from disclosing
information on IC. In this context, certain studies report that the level of IC disclosure
decreases as property becomes concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders (Oliveira
et al., 2006; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Kumar, 2013), and also as
corporate property costs go up (Jones, 2007).
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Lastly, according to the third stream, several studies show that increased disclosure
of information on IC improves corporate value on the financial market
(Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Gerpott et al., 2008; Vafaei et al., 2011), while at the same time
increasing share liquidity (Graham et al., 2005), which reduces the company’s cost of
capital (Kristandl and Bontis, 2007; Mangena et al., 2010; Boujelbene and Affes, 2013).
This contributes to greater efficiency in themarkets, and, for companies, it means better
resource allocation on the financial market (OECD, 2006a; Zéghal and Maaloul, 2011).
4. Developing the hypothesis
The development of our hypothesis is based on the previous literature on the
relationship between financial statement informativeness and voluntary disclosure of
extra-financial information. According to Verrecchia (1990) low financial statement
informativeness indicates that there is a high asymmetry of information between
company managers and shareholders. This information asymmetry creates a demand
for more information from shareholders, and also provides a reason for managers to
provide this information, as the value of this extra-information is very high in this
situation. In this setting, Cohen (1992) showed that biotechnology companies
voluntarily disclose several types of extra-information due to the high information
asymmetry between the company and its investors, and, therefore, to the failure of
traditional financial information to provide relevant information to investors.
Moreover, Lang and Lundholm (1993) reported that companies with low financial
statement informativeness have a higher disclosure score, using the scores calculated by
the Association for Investment Management and Research as a proxy for voluntarily
disclosure. Tasker (1998) documented a similar negative or substitutive relationship
between the probability of a company providing additional voluntary disclosures
through “conference calls” and the financial statement informativeness. For their part,
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) showed that companies that voluntarily disclose
pro-forma earnings in the USA are companies with the lowest financial statement
informativeness.More recently, Ball et al. (2013) found thatManagementDiscussion and
Analysis disclosures are more informative when the financial statements are less
informative and vice versa.
However, contrary to expectations, Francis et al. (2008), using a sample of US
companies, found that companies with high financial statement informativeness have
more expansive voluntary disclosures in their annual reports than companies with low
financial statement informativeness. According to these authors, even companies with
high financial statement informativeness may also wish to disclose more information
externally because the market will otherwise interpret non-disclosure as bad news, and
will discount the company’s value accordingly.
Consequently, we can conclude that the results of the previous studies on the
relationship between financial statement informativeness and voluntary disclosure of
extra-financial information are generallymixed.Moreover, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no studies on the relationship between financial statement informativeness
and voluntary disclosure of IC information. This leads directly to the hypothesis of our
study, according to which we will assume that companies which invest in IC have low
financial statement informativeness due to the lack of accounting recognition of IC as an
asset. All things being equal, these companies will voluntarily disclose information on
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IC to mitigate the problem of distortion of their financial information, where there is an
inverse relationship between financial statement informativeness and IC disclosure.
This falls into economic and managerial logic according to which information
deserves to be produced and disseminated insofar as the anticipated value exceeds its
production and dissemination costs.We state this prediction formally as our hypothesis:
H. There is a negative (substitutive) relationship between financial statement
informativeness and IC disclosure.
5. Methodology
5.1 Selecting the sample
Our sample is based on all US companies that were listed on the S&P500 index during
2009[1].
From this initial sample, we have eliminated companies belonging to the SIC 6
(banks, insurance and real estate companies) due to the different accounting rules
applied to these sectors (153 companies). We also excluded companies whose fiscal
years do not end on December 31 to ensure that all companies were subject to the same
industry conditions and that investors had access to the same micro-economic and
industry data during the sample period (107 companies).
Given that the “financial statement informativeness” variable is calculated for each
company over the past 10 years in a time series, we also eliminated the companies that
have been in existence for less than 10 years (69 companies). In addition, companies who
have not published their annual reports and those for which some data were missing
from Bloomberg Professional database were also excluded (35 companies). Finally, we
eliminated any company with a negative book value of equity (ten companies), which
reduced our final sample to a total of 126 listed US companies[2].
To take into account the very different role of IC from sector to sector, we chose to
divide our sample, as did Francis and Schipper (1999) and Lougee andMarquardt (2004),
into two groups: High-tech and low-tech companies. To do this, we decided on a
stringent classification scheme as provided by Francis and Schipper (1999) based on
three-digit SIC codes.
Table I shows that our sample is dominated by the group of low-tech companies (83
companies), which represents 65.9 per cent of our overall sample. High-tech companies
(43 companies), however, represent only 34.1 per cent of the overall sample, which is not
surprising since these companies generally represent the new economy.
5.2 Measuring variables
5.2.1 Measuring the IC disclosure variable. To measure the IC disclosure variable, we
used the content analysismethod. Thismethod involves analysing the corporate annual
reports (in classical form and in the 10-K Form[3]) to extract financial and non-financial
qualitative and quantitative data on a company’s IC. These data were coded using a
Table I.
Sample distribution
by groups of
companies
Groups No. (%)
High-tech companies 43 34.1
Low-tech companies 83 65.9
Total 126 100
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coding sheet, which attributed scores to create indices for measuring the IC disclosure
variable.
The content analysis method: Content analysis is a data collection technique that
involves coding qualitative and quantitative information into predefined categories to
derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of the information (Zéghal andAhmed,
1990; Guthrie et al., 2004; Krippendorff, 2004).
To codify the IC information, we chose to use sentences as analysis units for our
study. Indeed, there has long been a debate in the accounting literature on using words,
sentences, paragraphs or pages as the code base. In this context,most researchers (Milne
and Adler, 1999; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Beattie and Thomson, 2007) agree that the
sentence as an analysis unit is the most reliable and preferred over other analysis units
because the objective is to describe the meaning of the document being analysed.
Lastly, to ensure that our content analysis is reliable, we carried out the following
tasks:
• To ensure stability: The first author analysed the contents of annual reports from
a sub-sample of ten companies. The contents of these reports were reanalysed a
second time by the same author one month later. The results were compared and
resulted in Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.912, which was deemed satisfactory[4].
• To ensure reproducibility: The analysis of the contents in the first ten annual
reports was redone by the second author. The results were compared and led to
Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.822, which was deemed satisfactory.
IC disclosure indices: Before measuring the IC disclosure variable, it is essential to first
determine the checklist of IC items to look for in annual reports. To do this, we adopted
a stringent classification of categories and subcategories (items) for IC, as developed by
Li et al. (2008). This classification consists of dividing the IC into three categories, i.e.
human capital, structural capital and relational capital, which are again subdivided into
several subcategories (items) (see Appendix).
The main reasons motivating our choice to adopt this IC classification list are the
following:
• IC categories and items are defined clearly and in an operational manner;
• it is clear when an item belongs or does not belong to a particular category; and
• lastly, this list enabled us to discuss in advance the content of each category and
item, and examples of sentences, which increases the reliability of our coding
sheet.
On the basis of this IC classification, we built two indices to measure the IC disclosure
variable: one on the basis of disclosure quantity and the other measures disclosure
quality.
5.2.1.1 Index for measuring IC disclosure quantity. Our first index is based on the
volume or frequency of IC disclosure. Indeed, one of the main underlying assumptions
for analysing content is that the volume or the frequency of disclosure of a specific item
shows to what extent the person preparing the report considered this item to be
important (Striukova et al., 2008). In this regard, Beattie and Thomson (2007, p. 141)
point out that repetition is a communication strategy used to accentuate, reinforce and
show the importance granted by the manager to the subject. This importance given by
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the reporting entity to the different categories of information is therefore assumed to be
reflected by the quantity of information disclosed (Krippendorff, 2004). To determine the
volume or frequency of IC disclosure, we counted the number of times that an item
appeared in our predefined list of items.
Our first index for disclosure is therefore calculated as:
Quant_IC  Total number of items disclosed about IC
Based on Zéghal et al. (2007) and Li et al. (2008), if a sentence contained more than one
item related to IC, it was broken down into as many sentences needed to take into
account all IC items. However, certain authors, including Beattie and Thomson (2007),
and Sonnier (2008), pointed out that only measuring the quantity of IC disclosure does
not suffice as an indicator, thus the necessity of developing measurements based on the
quality of disclosure.
5.2.1.2 Index for measuring IC disclosure quality. At this time, measuring disclosure
quality is one of the main topics debated and unresolved in the literature on disclosure.
Given the difficulty of directly estimating disclosure quality, certain studies on
disclosure indices assume that the quantity of disclosure regarding specific subjects
may be considered to be a proxy for the quality of disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Beattie
et al., 2004). This point of view is nevertheless completely wrong (Cerbioni and
Parbonetti, 2007; Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Indeed, several researchers, including
Hackston and Milne (1996), and Guthrie et al. (2004), recommend using an approach
that takes into account the quality of disclosure by examining the existence of the
disclosure, the disclosure category and the type of disclosure. Based on these
recommendations, we developed for this study our own index based on the
orientation of the information disclosed on IC, such as historic/forward-looking
orientation and qualitative/quantitative orientation.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for each sentence containing IC information, we attributed
the following scores:
• Score 1: If the sentence contains qualitative historic information on IC.
• Score 2: If the sentence contains quantitative historic information on IC.
• Score 3: If the sentence contains qualitative forward-looking information on IC.
• Score 4: If the sentence contains quantitative forward-looking information on IC.
Our second index is therefore calculated as:
Qual_IC  Sum of scores assigned
Figure 1.
Orientation of the
information disclosed
on IC
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To ensure that the index captured quality and not quantity of disclosure, we took
into account an item disclosed by the company only once, even if it was repeated
several times in the report (Oliveira et al., 2006; Jones, 2007; Cerbioni and Parbonetti,
2007).
Therefore, Figure 1 implies that the more information is future-oriented and is of a
quantitative nature, the better its quality. Indeed, the heaviest weight (score 4) is
assigned to quantitative forward-looking information because this type of information
is considered more relevant to users of information, especially stock market investors,
and will also increase the reputation and credibility of management.
Documents analysed: In the same manner as several researchers, including Jones
(2007) and Francis et al. (2008), we chose to perform our content analysis on annual
reports (in classical format and on the 10-K Form) of US companies.We chose the annual
report as the basis for content analysis for the following reasons:
• It is considered to be the most important source of information and continues to
play a pivotal role in corporate communications to its internal and external users
(Botosan, 1997; Guthrie et al., 2004; Oliveira et al., 2006; Bin Abdullah and
Ku-Ismail, 2008).
• It is the only communication source that is produced on a regular basis by all
listed companies and offers the possibility of performing comparative analyses of
management policies through the reporting periods (Vergauwen et al., 2007).
• Several previous studies found that the amount of disclosure in annual reports is
positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided in other media, such
as Web sites, press releases and conference calls (Lang and Lundholm, 1993;
Gerpott et al., 2008). This indicates that companies coordinate their disclosure
policies. Therefore, the choice of measuring disclosure produced by any reporting
source could be considered a proxy for the general level of disclosure provided by
the company (Botosan, 1997).
• Lastly, a number of researchers, includingGuthrie et al. (2004) and Striukova et al.
(2008), suggest limiting the number of documents analysed in a study to prevent
the researcher’s work from being too daunting. Limiting the field of investigation
to annual reports provides a relevant and useful proxy for analysing information
disclosed for corporate IC.
5.2.2 Measuring the financial statement informativeness variable. The financial
statement informativeness (FSI) has been examined in term of value relevance. Two
different empirical measures have been used in previous research. The first one is the
“determination coefficient (R2)” used in association studies to assess the explanatory
power of the financial information in explainingmarket behaviour (Amir and Lev, 1996;
Brown et al., 1999; Dontoh et al., 2004; Rahman andMohd-Saleh, 2008; Hail, 2013) and the
second one is the “earnings response coefficient (ERC)” used in event studies to assess
the effect of the earnings announcement on security returns (Ryan and Zarowin, 2003).
We adopt the determination coefficient (R2) because of its relevance to this research
while avoiding some limitations associated with ERC[5]. The adjusted R2 is estimated
through the following linear regression:
Piq  0  1 EPSiq  2 BVPSiq  3 EPS_Negiq  iq
75
Financial
statement
informativeness
Where:
Piq  Stock price for company i at the end of the second month following
quarter q.
EPSiq  Net earnings or net loss per share for company i in quarter q.
BVPSiq  Book value of equity per share i at the end of quarter q.
EPS_Negiq  1 if the EPS is negative; if not, 0.
iq  Other information.
A high adjusted R2 value would indicate that the financial information largely
explains the variation in corporate stock price. Therefore, this means that this
financial information is considered to be “informative” for the market shareholders.
Conversely, where the adjusted R2 value is low, this would indicate that the
variation in stock price can be explained by other non-financial information, in
particular information on IC that is not taken into account in the corporate financial
statements.
Given that this equation is estimated in time-series for each company to determine
the financial statement informativeness (FSI), we used, like Amir and Lev (1996) and
Lougee and Marquardt (2004), quarterly data over a period of 10 years (10 years  4
quarters 40 observations). Indeed, our assumption is that the past financial statement
informativeness is a reasonable proxy for the current financial statement
informativeness (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).
5.2.3 Measuring control variables. Six control variables were used in this study to
control their effect on disclosure of IC information:
(1) Company size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of
total assets (Zéghal et al., 2007; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007).
(2) Performance (ROA) is measured using the return on assets ratio, i.e. net earnings
divided by total assets (Williams, 2001; Oliveira et al., 2006).
(3) Risk (BETA) is measured using beta from the capital asset pricing model
(Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 2007).
(4) Growth (GRW) ismeasured by the company’s annual sales growth (Cerbioni and
Parbonetti, 2007, Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 2007; Soon Yau et al., 2009).
(5) Leverage (LEV) is measured using the total debt/book value of equity ratio
(Garcia-Meca et al., 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007).
(6) Analysts’ coverage (COV) is measured by the number of analysts following the
company (Boujelbene and Affes, 2013).
All these variables are obtained from Bloomberg professional database.
5.3 Research equations and analysis method
To meet our research objective, we propose to empirically test the following two
equations:
Equation (A) based on the quantity of IC disclosure:
Quant_ICi  0  1 FSIi  2 SIZEi  3 ROAi  4 BETAi  5 GRWi
 6 LEVi  7 COVi  i
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Equation (B) based on the quality of IC disclosure:
Qual_ICi  0  1 FSIi  2 SIZEi  3 ROAi  4 BETAi  5 GRWi
 6 LEVi  7 COVi  i
Where:
Quant_ICi  Index measuring the quantity of IC disclosure for company i.
Qual_ICi  Index measuring the quality of IC disclosure for company i.
FSIi  Financial statement informativeness for company i.
SIZEi  Size of company i.
ROAi  Performance of company i.
BETAi  Risk of company i.
GRWi  Sales growth of company i.
LEVi  Leverage ratio for company i.
COVi  Analysts’ coverage for company i.
Given that the dependent variables in equationsA andB (Quant_IC andQual_IC) are count
data,whichdonot includenegativevalues (because theymeasure thenumberof occurrences
of an event: the information disclosed on IC), the linear regression method[6] should not be
applied.
Based on Zéghal et al. (2007) and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), in this study, we
used the Poisson regression method to estimate equations A and B. This method is
considered to be the best approach to process count data (Kennedy, 2003). The datawere
analysed using the SPSS 18 software.
6. Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table II presents the means, standard deviations, medians, minimum and maximum
values of all the variables. The mean of index measuring the quantity of IC disclosure
(Quant_IC) is approximately 101 and varies between 27 and 245 for information
disclosed on IC in the annual reports of US companies. Moreover, the mean of index
measuring the quality of IC disclosure (Qual_IC) is approximately 47 and varies
between 21 and 72 for scores assigned to the information disclosed on IC.
Table II also shows that the mean of financial statement informativeness (FSI),
measured using the determination coefficient (adjusted R2) from the linear regressions
of stock price on earnings and book values is 27.6 per cent. This coefficient varies
between 7.5 and 88.9 per cent.
To compare the two company groups (high-tech and low-tech) regarding IC
disclosure (Quant_IC and Qual_IC), we used the Mann–Whitney U test[7]. The results
for the mean difference appear in Table III. These results tell us that high-tech
companies disclose more information on IC (Quant_IC  86.47 and Qual_IC  84.57)
than those that are low-tech (Quant_IC  51.60 and Qual_IC  52.58), and that these
mean differences are statistically significant (p 0.000).
A better explanation of these results is that high-tech companies have large
investments in IC that do not appear in their financial statements given the lack of their
accounting recognition as assets by current accounting standards. As a solution, these
high-tech companies voluntarily disclose information on their IC to offset any
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shortcomings in financial information regarding IC and to better reflect the real value of
the company and its ability to create future earnings. As a result, high-tech companies
are more likely to disclose IC information than other companies. These results appear to
be consistent with those found by other researchers (includingAbdolmohammadi, 2005;
and Sonnier, 2008), who found that high-tech sectors disclose more IC information than
traditional sectors of the US economy.
Lastly, to compare the two company groups (high-tech and low-tech) regarding
financial statement informativeness (FSI), we used the student t-test[8]. The mean
difference results appear in Table IV. These results tell us that the financial statement
informativeness is lower in high-tech companies (0.248) than in low-tech (0.290). This
mean difference is statistically significant at threshold p 0.05.
This result would appear to be due to the fact that current accounting standards in
the USA prohibit the capitalisation of most IC investments, thus the distortion of the
financial information of companies heavily investing in IC. In this case, the stock price
for high-tech companies is no longer based on the financial information (such as
earnings or book value of equity), but rather on other relevant non-financial information
Table II.
Descriptive statistics
for selected variables
Variables N Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
Quant_IC 126 100.8 41.9 98.5 27 245
Qual_IC 126 46.9 11.7 47.5 21 72
FSI 126 0.276 0.237 0.227 0.075 0.889
Total assets (in Millions $) 126 19,408 3,189 8,744 1,235 233,323
SIZE (log Total assets) 126 9.229 1.088 9.076 7.12 12.36
ROA 126 0.055 6.885 0.047 0.171 0.350
BETA 126 1.063 0.262 1.053 0.406 1.784
GRW 126 0.099 2.373 0.098 0.535 1.225
LEV 126 0.709 7.577 0.505 0.000 7.037
COV 126 18.69 7.763 18 4 47
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Quant_IC is the index measuring the quantity of IC
disclosure, while Qual_IC is the index measuring the quality of IC disclosure. FSI is the financial
statement informativeness measured by the explanatory power (adjusted R2) from regressions of stock
price on earnings and book values.SIZE is the logarithmof total assets,ROA is the return on assets used
as an indicator of a company’s performance, BETA is the company’s risk measured through the capital
asset pricingmodel (CAPM),GRW is the company’s growth level measured by the annual sales growth,
LEV is the company’s leverage ratio measured using the total debt/book value of equity ratio, and COV
is the analyst’s coverage measured by the number of analysts following the company
Table III.
Two sample Mann–
Whitney U test
Disclosure
index
High-tech companies (n 43) Low-tech companies (n 83)
Statistic significanceAverage rank Average rank
Quant_IC 86.47 51.60 Z5.082
Asymp. sig 0.000***
Qual_IC 84.57 52.58 Z4.665
Asymp. sig 0.000***
Note: ***Significant at the 0.01 level
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like IC information. Our results are indeed consistentwith the results of previous studies
that found that the financial information was more distorted for high-tech companies
than for other companies (Core et al., 2003; Dontoh et al., 2004; Lougee and Marquardt,
2004).
6.2 Correlation analysis
The validation of our theoretical hypothesis will be assessed initially by evaluating the
correlation between dependent and independent variables. Correlation coefficients[9]
appear on Panel A in Table V for the entire sample and on Panel B and C for high-tech
and low-tech companies, respectively.
These results show that the correlation between financial statement informativeness
(FSI) and IC disclosure (Quant_IC orQual_IC) is only significant in high-tech companies
(Panel B). This correlation is statistically negative, which confirms our hypothesis for
high-tech companies. This result could be interpreted as follows: because the current
accounting standards prevent companies from capitalising their IC investments,
high-tech companies have low financial statement informativeness. To mitigate this
distortion problem in the financial information, High-tech companies use other
disclosure practices for IC information. In other words, the more the financial statement
informativeness is low, the more the high-tech company discloses information on its IC.
Regarding control variables, the results in Table V (Panel A, B and C) show that IC
disclosure (Quant_IC or Qual_IC) is positively and significantly correlated with the
company performance (ROA) and its growth level (GRW). The company size (SIZE) and
the number of analysts following the company (COV) are also positively correlated with
IC disclosure (Quant_IC or Qual_IC), but they are only significant in the high-tech
companies (Panel B). The leverage (LEV) is also positively correlated with IC disclosure
(Quant_IC or Qual_IC), but its only significant in the low-tech companies (Panel C).
Finally, our results reveal a significant negative correlation between company risk
(RISK) and IC disclosure (Quant_IC orQual_IC) in the entire sample (Panel A) and in the
high-tech companies (Panel B), respectively.
6.3 Multivariate analysis
The correlation analysis results constitute an initial approach for testing our hypothesis.
We will now continue testing this hypothesis using a multivariate analysis by
estimating the Poisson (A) and (B) regression equations.
6.3.1 Estimating equation A. The results of the Poisson regression regarding the
relationship between the financial statement informativeness and the quantity of IC
disclosure appear in Panel A of Table VI for the entire sample and on Panel B for the two
sub-samples (high-tech and low-tech companies).
Table IV.
Two sample t-test
FSI
High-tech companies (n 43) Low-tech companies (n 83)
SignificanceMean (SD) Mean (SD)
Adjusted R2 0.248 (0.234) 0.290 (0.239) 0.035**
Note: **Significant at the 0.05 level
79
Financial
statement
informativeness
As shown in Table VI, the overall model for the regression equation is deemed
satisfactory for the whole sample as well as for the two sub-samples, as all ratio
chi-square ratio probabilities are statistically significant (p 0.000).
The results in Table VI show a statistically significant negative association between
financial statement informativeness (FSI) and IC disclosure (Quant_IC) in the whole
sample (Panel A) and in the sub-sample of High-tech companies (Panel B). However, this
association is not significant in the sub-sample of Low-tech companies (Panel B). These
results therefore confirm, at least partially, our hypothesis that there is a substitutive
relationship between financial statement informativeness and IC disclosure for USA
companies, specifically those operating in High-tech sectors.
Our results may be explained in the following manner: When the financial statement
informativeness is low, it is in the interest of the managers of companies, especially
High-tech ones, to disclose information on their IC to mitigate the problem of distortion
of their financial information due to the non-recognition of IC investments as assets by
current accounting standards.
Table V.
Correlation matrix
Variables Quant_IC Qual_IC FSI SIZE ROA BETA GRW LEV COV
Panel A: Whole sample, n  126
Quant_IC 1
Qual_IC 0.804*** 1
FSI 0.102 0.100 1
SIZE 0.084 0.106 0.047 1
ROA 0.356*** 0.330*** 0.017 0.081 1
BETA 0.305*** 0.265*** 0.118 0.143 0.496*** 1
GRW 0.373*** 0.326*** 0.173* 0.018 0.314*** 0.457*** 1
LEV 0.003 0.069 0.052 0.100 0.202** 0.167* 0.033 1
COV 0.107 0.097 0.013 0.396*** 0.107 0.170* 0.034 0.062 1
Panel B: High-tech companies, n  43
Quant_IC 1
Qual_IC 0.505*** 1
FSI 0.313*** 0.383*** 1
SIZE 0.308** 0.226 0.007 1
ROA 0.325** 0.291** 0.060 0.199 1
BETA 0.305** 0.040 0.139 0.113 0.481*** 1
GRW 0.481*** 0.273* 0.127 0.089 0.243 0.397*** 1
LEV 0.187 0.100 0.179 0.077 0.139 0.407*** 0.069 1
COV 0.441*** 0.319** 0.050 0.337** 0.232 0.256* 0.164 0.012 1
Panel C: Low-tech companies, n  83
Quant_IC 1
Qual_IC 0.814*** 1
FSI 0.069 0.060 1
SIZE 0.036 0.079 0.079 1
ROA 0.242** 0.220** 0.043 0.245** 1
BETA 0.153 0.176 0.079 0.185* 0.443*** 1
GRW 0.251** 0.224** 0.176 0.004 0.305*** 0.440*** 1
LEV 0.130 0.221** 0.069 0.135 0.307*** 0.007 0.134 1
COV 0.084 0.077 0.025 0.444*** 0.030 0.078 0.068 0.154 1
Notes: * , ** , and ***represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively
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Table VI.
Poisson regression
results (dependent
variable: Quant_IC)
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Regarding control variables, the results in Panel A and B of Table VII show that IC
disclosure (Quant_IC) is positively and significantly associated with the company’s size
(SIZE), its performance (ROA), its growth (GRW) and its leverage level (LEV), respectively.
Our results therefore confirm themajority of previous studies that the level of IC disclosure
increaseswith the company’s size (Bozzolan et al., 2003;Oliveira et al., 2006), its performance
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), its growth (Garcia-Meca et al., 2005) and leverage levels
(Gerpott et al., 2008). The association between IC disclosure (Quant_IC) and the number of
analysts following the company (COV) is also significantly positive in the whole sample
(PanelA) and in the sub-sample ofHigh-tech companies (PanelB). However, this association
is significantly negative in the sub-sample of Low-tech companies (Panel B). According to
these results, it seems thatHigh-techcompaniesvoluntarilydisclosemore informationabout
IC outside financial statementswhen they are followed by a large number of analysts, while
Low-tech companies disclose less information on IC when they are followed by a large
number of analysts. This could be related to the costs of properties driven by strategic
information disclosure and the close relationship between traditional companies and
financial analysts who want to keep the information private. Finally, our results show a
significantly negative association between IC disclosure (Quant_IC) and the company’s risk
(BETA), which is in line with the previous study by Garcia-Meca andMartinez (2007). This
result therefore implies that the level of IC disclosure decreases when the company is risky.
6.3.2 Estimating equation B. The results of the Poisson regression regarding the
relationship between the financial statement informativeness and the quality of IC
disclosure appear in Panel A of Table VII for the entire sample and on Panel B for the
two sub-samples (High-tech and Low-tech companies).
As seen in the Table VII, the overall model for the regression equation is deemed
satisfactory for the whole sample as well as for the two sub-samples, since all ratio
chi-square ratio probabilities are statistically significant (p 0.01).
In accordance with our correlation analysis results (Table V), the results in Table VII
show that the association between the financial statement informativeness (FSI) and IC
disclosure (Qual_IC) is only significant in high-tech companies (Panel B). This
statistically negative association therefore confirms, at least partially, our hypothesis
that there is a substitutive relationship between financial statement informativeness
and IC disclosure for US companies, particularly those operating in high-tech
sectors. This result implies that IC disclosure is used as a solution to compensate for the
poor financial statement informativeness in high-tech companies. In this sense, themore
the financial statement informativeness is low in high-tech companies, the greater is the
quality of their IC disclosure.
Regarding control variables, the results in Table VII show a significantly positive
association between the IC disclosure (Qual_IC) and the company’s performance (ROA),
its growth (GRW) and leverage levels (LEV), respectively. Our results are therefore in
line with themajority of previous studies that the quality of IC disclosure increases with
a company’s performance (Garcia-Meca et al., 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007), its
growth (Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 2007) and leverage levels (Gerpott et al., 2008). The
company’s size (SIZE) is also positively associated with IC disclosure (Qual_IC) but it is
only significant in low-tech companies (Panel B). However, neither company’s risk
(BETA) nor analysts’ coverage (COV) appear to have a statistically significant
association with IC disclosure (Qual_IC).
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Table VII.
Poisson regression
results (dependent
variable: Qual_IC)
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7. Summary and conclusions
Motivated by recent recommendations of regulators and standard-setters (FASB, 2001;
IASB, 2010; SEC, 2003; EFFAS, 2008; OECD, 2006a, 2006b, 2013; EC, 2011; etc.) regarding
disclosure, this study adds to the debate about the determinants of the voluntary disclosure
of IC information. Our primary research objective therefore was to empirically analyse the
relationship between financial statement informativeness and IC disclosure.
By using a sample of 126 US companies in 2009, our results teach us a number of things.
First, our results show that high-tech companies disclose more information in terms of
quantity and quality of IC than low-tech companies. This result would seem to be due to the
fact that high-tech companies have large investments in IC that do not appear in their
financial statements given the lack of their accounting recognition as assets by current
accounting standards. As a solution, these high-tech companies voluntarily disclose
information on their IC to offset any shortcomings in financial information regarding IC and
to better reflect the real value of the company and its ability to create future earnings.
Second, our results also show that the financial statement informativeness is lower in
high-tech companies than in low-tech companies. This result would appear to be due to the
current accounting standards in the USA that prohibit the capitalisation of most IC
investments; hence, the distortion of the financial information of companies that invest
heavily in IC.
Lastly, our results show a negative (substitutive) relationship between financial
statement informativeness and IC disclosure in high-tech companies. This result means
that when the financial statement informativeness is low, it is in the interest of the
managers of high-tech companies to disclose information on their IC to mitigate the
problem of distortion of their financial information due to the non-recognition of IC
investments as assets by current accounting standards.
The results of this studymayhave several practical implications.First, they can serve as
feedback to regulators and standard-setters to assess the current application of their
proposed frameworks and guidelines for the voluntary disclosure of IC information and to
empirically validate their theoretical statements. Second, they may encourage managers of
companies, especially high-tech ones, to voluntarily disclose information on IC to
compensate for the loss of relevance of financial information due to the lack of accounting
recognition of IC as an asset in the financial statements. Finally, they can contribute to the
current debate about the measurement of the quality of IC disclosure. Other researchers
could, therefore, use the index developed in this study to assess the quality of IC disclosure.
Notes
1. Following the majority of previous research, our study is based on a single year, i.e. 2009,
because disclosure policies for a company are considered relatively constant over the years
(Botosan, 1997).
2. The names of the sample companies can be obtained from the authors upon request.
3. The annual report on the 10-K Form is the report required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the USA, which provides a full summary of the performance of the listed
company.Although it has a similar name, the annual report on the 10-KForm is different from the
classical report of the “annual shareholders’ report” that a companymust send to its shareholders
when it holds its annual general assembly.MostUS companies combine these two annual reports
into one document. Taking the example of Jones (2007) and Francis et al. (2008), we conducted a
content analysis of these two reports, as they both contain IC information on the company.
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4. According to Milne and Adler (1999), the results of the Krippendorff’s alpha test (also called
Cronbach’s alpha) are judged acceptable if they are above the minimum limit of 0.7.
5. The ERC has been criticised in the literature as being too narrow because it only measures the
quality of earnings and ignores the quality of other financial information, such as the book value
of equity, which may also have an effect on the company’s market value (Lev et al., 2005).
6. In the classical linear regression model, the dependent variable is expressed by a linear
combination of explicative parameters under the assumption that the dependent variable has
a normal distribution. However, when the variable is count data, it follows Poisson’s Law. In
this sense, the Poisson regression model is appropriate for dependent variables, which have a
Poisson distribution.
7. As the IC disclosure variable (Quant_IC and Qual_IC) is count data, which does not take into
account negative values, we used the Mann–Whitney U average difference test, which is a
non-parametric test that does not require the normality of the variable under study.
8. As the variable for financial statement informativeness (FSI) is ametric variable (continuous),
we used a parametric test, namely, the Student’s t-test for mean difference.
9. When the correlation examined involves count data, Spearman’s correlation coefficient is
present. If this is not the case, where the correlation examined involves two metric variables
(continuous), Pearson’s correlation coefficient is present.
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Appendix
Table AI.
IC categories and
subcategories (items)
Human capital Structural capital Relational capital
1. Number of employees
2. Employee age
3. Employee diversity
4. Employee equality
5. Employee relationship
6. Employee education
7. Skills/know-how
8. Employee work-related
competences
9. Employee work-related
knowledge
10. Employee attitudes/behavior
11. Employee commitments
12. Employee motivation
13. Employee productivity
14. Employee training
15. Vocational qualifications
16. Employee development
17. Employee flexibility
18. Entrepreneurial spirit
19. Employee capabilities
20. Employee teamwork
21. Employee involvement with
community
22. Other employee features
1. Intellectual property
2. Process
3. Management philosophy
4. Corporate culture
5. Organization flexibility
6. Organization structure
7. Organization learning
8. Research & development (R&D)
9. Innovation
10. Technology
11. Financial dealings
12. Customer support function
13. Knowledge-based infrastructure
14. Quality management &
improvement
15. Accreditations (certificate)
16. Overall infrastructure/capability
17. Networking
18. Distribution network
1. Customers
2. Market presence
3. Customer relationships
4. Customer acquisition
5. Customer retention
6. CTE
7. Customer involvement
8. Company image/reputation
9. Company awards
10. Public relation
11. Diffusion & networking
12. Brands
13. Distribution channels
14. Relationship with suppliers
15. Business collaboration
16. Business agreements
17. Favorite contract
18. Research collaboration
19. Marketing
20. Relationship with
stakeholders
21. Market leadership
Source: Li et al. (2008)
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